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What Market Risk Capital 
Reporting Tells Us
about Bank Risk
n recent years, financial market supervisors and the financial 
services industry have placed increased emphasis on the role 
of public disclosure in ensuring the efficient and prudent 
operation of financial institutions. In particular, disclosures 
about financial institutions’ risk exposures have frequently been 
cited as an important way for debt and equity market 
participants to get the information necessary to exercise “market 
discipline” on the risk-taking activities of these institutions. Such 
market discipline is often viewed as an important means of 
influencing the behavior of financial institutions, especially with 
regard to their risk-taking activities.
For instance, a 1994 report by the Euro-currency Standing 
Committee of the Bank for International Settlements stated 
that “financial markets function most efficiently when market 
participants have sufficient information about risks and 
returns to make informed investment and trading 
decisions.”1 Similarly, in recent proposed amendments to the 
minimum regulatory capital requirements for internationally 
active banks, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
included market discipline as a primary pillar, and the 
proposals themselves contained extensive recommendations 
for disclosures about banks’ risk exposures (see Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision [2001]). Finally, a group 
of senior officials of large financial institutions recently 
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• Since 1998, U.S. bank holding companies 
with large trading operations have been 
required to hold capital sufficient to cover the 
market risks in their trading portfolios. The 
capital amounts that each institution must 
hold, disclosed in publicly available regulatory 
reports, appear to offer new information about 
the market risk exposures undertaken by 
these institutions.
• An empirical analysis suggests that the market 
risk capital figures do, in fact, provide 
information about the evolution of individual 
institutions’ risk exposures over time that is 
not found in other regulatory report data. 
In particular, changes in an institution’s capital 
charges prove to be a strong predictor of 
changes in the volatility of its future trading 
revenue.
• By contrast, the market risk capital figures 
provide little information about differences 
in market risk exposure across institutions 
beyond what is already conveyed by the 
relative size of an institution’s trading account.
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issued a report acknowledging the role of public disclosure, 
among other practices, in maintaining market discipline 
and shareholder value (see Working Group on Public 
Disclosure [2001]).
This emphasis on disclosure and market discipline rests on 
the assumption that the disclosures made by financial 
institutions provide meaningful information about risk to 
market participants. Various recommendations have been 
made by supervisors and the financial services industry about 
the types of information that would be most effective in 
conveying an accurate picture of financial firms’ true risk 
exposures as they evolve over time. This article assesses one 
particular source of information about the risk facing certain 
large U.S. banking companies to see how well it captures 
variation in risk exposures, both across institutions and over 
time.
The data examined are derived from publicly disclosed 
regulatory report information on minimum regulatory capital 
requirements. Since 1998, banks and bank holding companies 
(BHCs) in the United States have been subject to a new set of 
regulatory minimum capital standards intended to cover the 
market risk in their trading portfolios. Market risk is the risk of 
loss from adverse movements in financial rates and prices, such 
as interest rates, exchange rates, and equity and commodity 
prices.
The market risk capital standards were introduced as a 
supplement to the existing capital standards for credit risk for 
institutions with large trading portfolios. The innovative 
feature of the market risk capital standards is that they are 
based on the output of banks’ internal risk measurement 
models, rather than on a standardized set of regulatory risk 
weights. In theory, relying on banks’ internal models means 
that regulatory capital requirements should be more closely 
tied to the actual risks facing these institutions. By extension, 
examining the required capital amounts for different banking 
organizations could provide new insight into the nature and 
extent of market risk in the U.S. banking industry.
Banks and bank holding companies subject to the new 
capital standards have been required to disclose their market 
risk capital requirements on publicly available regulatory 
reports since the first quarter of 1998. This article examines the 
market risk capital amounts reported by BHCs to determine 
what, if any, new information they provide about the market 
risk exposures undertaken by these institutions and how those 
exposures evolve over time. The goal of the analysis is not to 
ascertain whether the required minimum capital amounts are 
sufficient to provide a “prudent” level of coverage against the 
risks these institutions face. Such an analysis would require 
examining the objectives of supervisors in calibrating the 
capital standards and how banks have reacted to the incentives 
imposed by them.2 Instead, the analysis focuses on assessing 
the extent to which the regulatory report disclosures provide 
new information that would allow market participants to assess 
differences in market risk exposure accurately across 
institutions and for a given institution over time.
Our first finding is that regulatory capital for market risk 
represents a small share of the overall amount of minimum 
regulatory capital for most institutions subject to the market 
risk capital requirements. Market risk capital represented less 
than 2 percent of overall minimum regulatory capital for the 
median bank subject to the new capital standards. Although 
there has been some amount of quarter-to-quarter variation, 
the median share of regulatory capital accounted for by market 
risk capital has remained fairly constant since the standards 
came into effect at the beginning of 1998.
Our second set of findings concerns the extent of new 
information contained in the market risk capital amounts 
included in the regulatory reports. We assess the correlation 
between the market risk capital figures and regulatory report 
information on trading account size and composition as well as 
independent measures of market risk exposure based on daily 
trading profit and loss information for selected bank holding 
companies. The assessment is made both across banks using 
average values for each firm over the sample period, and, using 
a fixed-effects specification, for individual banking 
organizations over time.
Our analysis suggests that, when we look across banks, the 
market risk capital figures provide little additional information 
about the extent of an institution’s market risk exposure 
beyond that conveyed by simply knowing the relative size of the 
trading account. In contrast, when we look at individual banks 
over time, the market risk capital requirements do appear to 
provide information that is not available from other data 
contained in regulatory reports. These findings suggest that the 
market risk capital figures reported by bank holding companies 
are most useful for tracking changes in market risk exposures 
at individual banks over time.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: the next 
section provides an overview of the market risk capital charges 
and the banking organizations that are subject to them. 
Following that, we present some basic facts about the market 
risk capital figures and what they imply about the share of 
overall bank holding company minimum regulatory capital 
accounted for by market risk. The analysis next assesses the 
degree of new information contained in the market risk capital 
figures; we then expand this discussion to compare the market 
risk capital figures with independent measures of bank holding 
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2. Overview of the Market Risk
Capital Standards
The market risk capital standards are intended to ensure that 
banks hold capital sufficient to cover the market risks in their 
trading portfolios. While market risk can arise from the full 
range of banking activities, it is most prominent in trading 
activities, where positions are marked-to-market daily. Thus, 
the market risk capital standards concentrate on positions in 
banking organizations’ trading portfolios.3
The standards implemented in the United States are based 
on ones adopted internationally by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, a group made up of bank supervisors 
from the Group of Ten countries.4 In both settings, the market 
risk standards were intended to supplement the existing capital 
standards for credit risk, which were established with the 
adoption of the 1988 Basel Accord. Both standards established 
methods for calculating the minimum amount of capital that 
banks would be required to hold against various on- and off-
balance-sheet positions. A banking institution’s overall 
minimum regulatory capital requirement equals the sum of its 
requirements for credit and market risk.
The market risk capital requirements are calculated in two 
steps, reflecting two different aspects of overall market risk. 
General market risk is the risk arising from movements in the 
general level of market rates and prices. Specific risk, in contrast, is 
defined as the risk of adverse price movements in the price of an 
individual security resulting from factors related to the security’s 
issuer. The market risk capital standards include separate 
minimum capital requirements for each of these elements, which 
are combined to form the overall market risk capital charge.
As we observed, the innovative feature of the market risk 
capital standards is that the minimum capital requirements are 
based on the output of banks’ internal risk measurement models. 
In particular, the capital requirement for general market risk is 
based on the output of banks’ internal value-at-risk models, 
calibrated to a common supervisory standard. A value-at-risk 
model produces an estimate of the maximum amount that a 
bank can lose on a particular portfolio over a given holding 
period with a given degree of statistical confidence. These models 
are widely used by banks and other financial institutions with 
large trading businesses and typically play an important role in 
these institutions’ risk management processes.
The general market risk capital requirement is based on 
value-at-risk estimates calibrated to a ten-day holding period 
and a 99th percentile degree of statistical confidence.5 In 
particular, the minimum capital requirement is equal to the 
average value-at-risk estimate over the previous sixty trading 
days (approximately one-quarter of the trading year) multiplied 
by a “scaling factor,” which is generally equal to three.
The scaling factor can be higher than three—up to a 
maximum of four—if a bank experiences enough trading 
portfolio losses that exceed its daily value-at-risk estimates to 
call the accuracy of the model into question. This 
determination is made through a process known as “back-
testing,” in which daily value-at-risk estimates are compared 
with next-day trading results.6 If trading losses exceed the 
value-at-risk estimates too many times over a given period, 
then the presumption that the model is providing an accurate 
measure of the 99th percentile of losses is rejected and a higher 
scaling factor is applied as a very approximate means of 
compensating for this underestimation. This assessment is 
performed quarterly, which means that changes in the scaling 
factor can introduce quarter-to-quarter variation in minimum 
regulatory capital requirements beyond that implied by 
variation in the underlying value-at-risk estimates. Supervisors 
also have the discretion to increase the scaling factor because of 
qualitative concerns about the accuracy of a bank’s model.
The minimum capital requirements for specific risk may be 
based either on internal models—to the extent these models 
incorporate specific risk estimation—or on a set of 
standardized supervisory risk weights. Estimates of specific risk 
based on internal models are generally subject to a scaling 
factor of four. As stated above, the overall minimum capital 
requirement for market risk equals the sum of the 
requirements for general market risk and specific risk.
Since the focus of the market risk capital standards is on 
trading portfolio positions, only those U.S. banks and bank 
holding companies with significant amounts of trading activity 
are subject to these capital requirements. In particular, the U.S. 
standards apply to banks and BHCs with trading account 
positions (assets plus liabilities) exceeding $1 billion, or 10 per-
cent of total assets. Supervisors also have the discretion to impose 
the standards on institutions that do not meet these criteria if 
such a step appears necessary for safety and soundness reasons, 
or to exempt an institution that otherwise meets the criteria if it 
is believed that its actual market risk exposure is small. Finally, 
banks may choose to “opt in” to the market risk standards, with 
supervisory approval.
Although the institutions meeting these criteria are relatively 
few in number, they hold the vast majority of trading positions 
in the U.S. banking system. As of December 2001, the nineteen 
bank holding companies that were subject to the market risk 
capital requirements accounted for 98 percent of the trading 
positions held by all U.S. banking organizations. All of these 
organizations are among the largest in the U.S. banking system 
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standards at the beginning of 1998, the number of BHCs subject 
to the market risk standards has ranged between sixteen and 
twenty per quarter. The number has tended to decline over time, 
due mostly to the effect of mergers between the large banking 
organizations subject to the capital standard.
3.M a r k e t  R i s k  C a p i t a l
Requirements: Basic Findings
One of the key benefits of basing the market risk capital 
standards on the output of banks’ internal risk measurement 
models is that the resulting minimum capital requirements 
should more closely track the actual risks facing banking 
organizations. While this risk sensitivity is an important 
feature from a capital perspective, it also has significant 
implications for the ability of supervisors and others to 
monitor the risk profiles of these institutions. The banking 
organizations subject to the market risk capital standards are 
required to report their minimum regulatory capital 
requirements for market risk in their regulatory reports.7 
These reports are publicly available, so information on 
market risk capital is widely accessible. Thus, the market risk 
capital figures disclosed in the regulatory reports are a 
potentially important source of new information about the 
risks facing these institutions.
As a first exercise, we can use the regulatory report data to 
develop a better understanding of the contribution that market 
risk makes to banks’ overall minimum regulatory capital 
requirements. This exercise helps provide a basic sense of the 
importance of market risk capital in banks’ overall regulatory 
capital structure and may also provide a very rough sense of the 
contribution of market risk to banks’ overall risk profiles.8
Table 1 reports the minimum regulatory capital 
requirements for market risk for the nineteen bank holding 
companies subject to the market risk capital standards as of 
December 2001. Market risk capital requirements ranged 
between $1 million and $2.5 billion for these institutions, with 
the majority reporting minimum required capital amounts of 
less than $250 million. There is some correlation with overall 
Table 1
Bank Holding Companies Subject to Market Risk Capital Standards
December 2001
Banking Organization
Market Risk Capital Requirement
(Billions of Dollars)
Total Assets
(Billions of Dollars) Asset Size Rank
Citigroup Inc. 2.510 1,051 1
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. 1.929 694 2
Bank of America Corporation 2.355 622 3
Wachovia Corporation 0.370 331 4
Wells Fargo & Co. 0.164 308 5
Bank One Corporation 0.156 269 6
Taunus Corporation 0.261 227 8
FleetBoston Financial Corporation 0.257 204 9
ABN Amro North America Holding Co. 0.093 172 10
U.S. Bancorp 0.038 171 11
HSBC North America Inc. 0.138 110 12
Suntrust Banks, Inc. 0.023 105 14
The Bank of New York Company, Inc. 0.043 81 15
Keycorp 0.017 80 16
State Street Corporation 0.056 70 19
PNC Financial Services Group 0.017 70 20
Countrywide Credit Industries, Inc. 0.001 37 30
Mellon Financial Corporation 0.050 36 32
CIBC Delaware Holdings Inc. 0.134 32 35
Source: Federal Reserve FR Y-9C Reports.
Note: The commercial bank holding companies listed are those that reported positive market risk equivalent assets on Schedule HC-I
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asset size: the institutions with the largest overall assets report 
the highest market risk capital requirements. These large 
institutions also tend to have the most extensive trading 
activities, so this association is not surprising.
To explore the role of minimum regulatory capital for 
market risk in these institutions’ overall required capital 
amounts, we calculate the ratio of required minimum capital 
amounts for market risk to overall required minimum capital 
for each bank holding company for each quarter that it is 
subject to the market risk capital standards. There is a 
maximum of sixteen observations per bank holding company 
(based on quarterly reporting from 1998:1 to 2001:4), although 
in practice, most institutions have fewer than sixteen 
observations, largely as the result of mergers that cause 
companies to enter and leave the sample. We handle mergers 
by treating the pre- and post-merger organizations as different 
bank holding companies, even if they retain the same name and 
regulatory identification numbers following the merger. 
Finally, we limit our sample to top-tier U.S. bank holding 
companies, that is, to bank holding companies that are not 
themselves owned by a foreign banking organization. We 
exclude the foreign-owned organizations because the trading 
activities and capital figures reported for these banks are not 
independent of the activities of the parent banking 
organization. Our final sample consists of 215 quarterly 
observations for twenty-seven bank holding companies.
The first observation we can make is that, for the typical 
banking organization in our sample, the share of overall risk 
derived from market risk is relatively small. The median ratio of 
market risk capital to overall required capital is just 1.8 percent. 
As illustrated in Chart 1, most bank holding companies subject 
to the market risk standards have ratios that fall below 5 percent 
on average, while a handful of companies have average ratios 
significantly above this level. For this latter group of institutions, 
the ratio of market risk to overall minimum required capital 
ranges between 5.5 percent and 22.0 percent on a quarterly basis. 
Not surprisingly, these companies tend to have large trading 
portfolios and a concentration in trading activities.
Aside from looking across banking organizations, it is also 
interesting to examine how the contribution of market risk to 
overall risk has changed over time. Chart 2 reports the median 
value of the ratio of market risk capital to overall minimum 
required capital for each quarter between the beginning of 1998 
and the end of 2001. This period includes the market 
turbulence in the third and fourth quarters of 1998, when 
markets reacted sharply to the Russian debt default and many 
banks reported significant losses in their trading portfolios.9
Overall, the median value of this ratio has remained fairly 
stable over the sample period, ranging between 1.0 percent and 
Market risk capital figures disclosed
[by banks with large trading operations]
in regulatory reports are a potentially 
important source of new information 
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2.3 percent, with a slight downward trend, especially during 
2001. Surprisingly, there is no evidence of an increase in the ratio 
during the financial market turbulence at the end of 1998. In fact, 
as illustrated in Chart 2, the median value of the ratio fell sharply 
from the second to third quarters of that year. Although some 
companies had ratios that rose sharply over this period, nine of 
the sixteen BHCs that reported market risk capital amounts in 
both the second and third quarters of 1998 had ratios that fell or 
remained relatively stable.
4.M a r k e t  R i s k  C a p i t a l :
New Information?
Although the analysis presented above helps us to understand 
the contribution that market risk makes to these institutions’ 
overall minimum regulatory capital requirements, it does not 
answer the question of whether the regulatory reports are a 
source of useful new information about risk exposures. To be 
useful sources of new information, regulatory report data 
would have to fulfill two basic requirements. First, the data 
would have to represent a source of public information not 
available elsewhere. Second, the data would have to provide 
accurate information about the extent of market risk exposure 
across different institutions and for individual institutions over 
time. We examine each of these questions in turn.
Turning first to whether the market risk capital figures 
contain new public information, it is helpful to review the 
timing and characteristics of the regulatory report information. 
As stated above, the regulatory reports containing the market 
risk capital figures are filed on a quarterly basis by bank holding 
companies. These figures are included in a broader set of 
reports that contain balance-sheet and income-statement 
information, as well as information about regulatory capital 
and other variables of interest to supervisors. The reports are 
reviewed by Federal Reserve staff and, in some cases, by 
examiners as part of the examination process. The reports must 
be submitted to the Federal Reserve by the bank holding 
companies within forty-five days of the end of the quarter, and 
are available to the public shortly after that date (following 
review and analysis by Federal Reserve staff).
Aside from information in the regulatory reports, there are 
additional sources of information available on banks’ market 
risk exposures. Supervisors, for instance, have access to 
information about banking organizations’ risk profiles through 
the examination process. The information available through 
this process includes the daily risk reports prepared by a bank’s 
risk management unit, assessments of model structure and 
accuracy prepared by a bank’s internal and external auditors, 
and direct assessments of the institution’s risk exposures by risk 
management units and by senior management. This infor-
mation is likely to be superior to the market risk capital 
information contained in regulatory reports, both because it is 
more detailed and because it is more timely.
These supervisory sources of information are confidential, 
however, and thus do not contribute to the information 
available to the broader public. Aside from the market risk 
capital figures, public sources of information about banks’ 
market risk exposures include disclosures made by banking 
organizations in their annual reports and filings with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Most of the 
institutions that are subject to the market risk capital 
standards also report value-at-risk figures in their 10-K and 
10-Q filings with the SEC.10 The quarterly 10-Q filings are 
available on a schedule that is generally consistent with the 
timing of the quarterly regulatory reports containing the 
market risk capital information.
The disclosures contained in the SEC filings generally 
include information about firmwide value-at-risk estimates 
similar to those that form the basis of the minimum regulatory 
capital requirement for market risk. In many cases, however, 
the SEC filings also contain a more detailed breakdown of risk 
exposures—for instance, value-at-risk estimates by different 
risk factors, such as interest rates, exchange rates, and equity 
prices—than is available in the regulatory reports.
While this greater level of detail suggests that the information 
in the SEC filings may be superior in some ways to the data 
contained in the bank regulatory reports, other features suggest 
that the market risk data in the two sources are complementary. 
Specifically, the data in the SEC filings vary significantly across 
institutions along a number of dimensions, including loss 
percentile used in the value-at-risk estimates and the way the 
figures are averaged over time.11 These differences complicate 
To be useful sources of new information, 
regulatory report data would have to . . . 
represent a source of public information 
not available elsewhere . . . [and] provide 
accurate information about the extent of  
market risk exposure across different 
institutions and for individual institutions 
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comparisons both across institutions and over time, as 
institutions sometimes change the way their figures are calculated 
and reported.12 In contrast, the market risk data contained in 
regulatory reports are reported on a consistent basis.
Differences across companies in the nature of the 
information contained in SEC filings make a direct empirical 
comparison of the SEC and regulatory report data difficult. 
Instead, we address a somewhat narrower question by 
examining the extent to which the new capital figures provide 
information about market risk not already contained in the 
regulatory reports. In other words, we examine the marginal 
contribution of the market risk capital disclosures over and 
above other market risk information contained in the 
regulatory reports.
In particular, we examine the market risk capital amounts 
reported by the sample bank holding companies and ask 
whether variation in these figures over time and across 
institutions reflects any new information about the extent of 
market risk exposure. As a first step, we compare the market 
risk capital data with a very broad measure of risk exposure—
the size of the trading accounts at the institutions that are 
subject to the new market risk standards.
The goal of this exercise is to determine whether variation in 
market risk capital across banks and over time contains any 
information not already reflected in the size of the trading 
account. That is, how highly correlated are variations in market 
risk capital with variations in the size of the trading account? To 
what extent would differences in market risk capital across 
banks, or changes in this figure for a given bank over time, 
provide a different sense of the extent of market risk exposure 
than variation in the size of the trading account? If the two 
variables are not highly correlated, we can take this as some 
initial evidence that the market risk capital figures contain some 
information not reflected in trading account size.13
We begin this analysis by regressing the market risk capital 
figures on trading account size (trading assets plus liabilities), 
and other variables contained in the regulatory reports that 
might shed light on the extent of market risk exposure. All 
variables are scaled by the institution’s total assets.14 Summary 
information about the market risk capital and the trading 
account size variables are reported in Table 2.
The results of these regressions are reported in Table 3. We 
run these regressions across bank holding companies using 
average values for each firm over the sample period (across-BHC 
regressions) and, using a fixed-effects specification, we run them 
for individual banking organizations over time (within-BHC 
regressions). The within-BHC sample can be interpreted as 
capturing the average degree of correlation between the market 
Table 2
Summary Statistics for Principal Variables
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Number of Observations Number of BHCs
Overall sample
Market risk capital 0.0216 0.0219 0.0010 0.1120 215 27
Trading 0.0820 0.1094 0.0010 0.5241 215 27
Derivatives 7.1190 9.6393 0.0000 35.2025 215 27
Within BHCs
Market risk capital 0.0000 0.0058 -0.0239 0.0296 215 27
Trading 0.0000 0.0192 -0.0670 0.0992 215 27
Derivatives 0.0000 1.6794 -8.1888 5.9283 215 27
Across BHCs
Market risk capital 0.0224 0.0220 0.0025 0.0824 27 27
Trading 0.0807 0.1086 0.0049 0.4249 27 27
Derivatives 6.9494 9.4359 0.0000 32.2537 27 27
Source: Federal Reserve FR Y-9C Reports.
Notes: The variables are defined as follows: market risk capital equals minimum regulatory capital for market risk divided by total bank holding company 
(BHC) assets. Trading equals trading account assets plus liabilities divided by total BHC assets. Derivatives equal the gross notional amount of derivatives 
contracts divided by total BHC assets. Overall sample results reflect the variables as defined. Within-BHC results have BHC-specific means removed from 
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risk capital figures and trading account size for individual 
banking companies over time. The across-BHC sample can be 
interpreted as capturing the degree of correlation by looking 
across the different banking companies in the sample.
Turning to the first two columns of Table 3, we see that 
there is a positive and significant correlation between the 
required amount of capital for market risk and the size of the 
trading account. The regression coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant for both the across-BHC and within-
BHC specifications,15 suggesting that there is some amount of 
common information in the two variables. That said, the R2s of 
the regressions—which reflect the extent to which variation in 
the market risk capital figures is captured by variation in the 
trading account size variable—suggest that some amount of the 
variation in the market risk capital remains unexplained. As 
indicated in the bottom row of Table 3, variations in trading 
account size represent 70 percent of the variation in the market 
risk capital figures looking across bank holding companies 
(column 1) and just 4 percent of the variation for individual 
bank holding companies over time (column 2).
These results are not meaningfully changed when additional 
regulatory report variables are added to the regression 
specification. Adding a second variable to control for the size of 
the BHCs’ derivatives positions has little impact on the results 
for either the across- or within-BHC results (columns 3 and 4 
of Table 3). Further, for the within-BHC specification, we can 
break trading account positions into several broad asset and 
liability categories and classify derivatives positions according 
to whether they are based on interest rates, exchange rates, 
equity prices, or commodity prices.16 While this augmented 
Table 3













Trading 0.1720** 0.0601** 0.2324** 0.0599**
(0.0215) (0.0216) (0.0338) (0.0217)
Derivatives -0.0009* 0.00005
(0.0004) (0.00025)
R2 0.718 0.040 0.766 0.040
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of required minimum capital 
for market risk to total bank holding company (BHC) assets. Trading is 
defined as the ratio of trading account assets plus trading account liabili-
ties to total assets for the bank holding company. Trading account assets 
and liabilities are adjusted so that revaluation gains and losses enter on a 
net basis. Derivatives are defined as the sum of the gross notional princi-
pals of interest rate, foreign exchange, equity, and commodity derivatives 
held in the trading account to total assets of the bank holding company. 
Across-BHC regressions are based on the average of the dependent and 
independent variables for each of the twenty-seven bank holding compa-
nies in the data set. Within-BHC regressions are estimated using fixed 
effects for each bank holding company.
**Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Table 4
Market Risk Capital and Trading Account
Composition
Within BHCs
Trading assets in domestic offices
Treasury securities 0.5142**
(0.0879)






All other debt securities 0.1626*
(0.0810)
Other trading assets 0.4304**
(0.1047)
Trading assets in foreign offices -0.0188
(0.0239)















Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of required minimum capital 
for market risk divided by total assets for the bank holding company 
(BHC). The independent variables are divided by the total assets of the 
bank holding company. The sum of Treasury securities, U.S. government 
agency securities, municipal securities, mortgage-backed securities, all 
other debt securities, other trading assets, trading assets in foreign 
offices, net revaluation gains, and short positions variables equals “trad-
ing” in the regressions in Table 3. The sum of the variables interest rate, 
foreign exchange, equity, and commodity equals “derivatives” in the 
regressions in Table 3. The regression is estimated using fixed effects for 
each of the twenty-seven BHCs in the data set.
**Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2003 45
regression specification raises the R2 of the within-BHC 
regression considerably (Table 4), it still leaves nearly half the 
variation in market risk capital unexplained.
These results suggest that the market risk capital figures 
disclosed in the regulatory reports may contain information 
about changes in individual institutions’ risk exposures over 
time that is not available from other regulatory report 
information. Nonetheless, it is possible that these findings 
could to some extent be driven by factors other than changes in 
risk exposure. In particular, the scaling factor used to convert 
value-at-risk estimates into regulatory capital charges could 
account for some of the differences in the market risk capital 
and trading account size variables. Because the scaling factor 
can change over time, variation in the reported market risk 
capital figures reflects both changes in an institution’s risk 
profile (that is, changes in the underlying value-at-risk 
measures) and variation in the scaling factors.
It is possible, therefore, that the unexplained variance in the 
market risk capital figures could be driven by changes in the 
scaling factor rather than by new information contained in the 
market risk capital figures. This is particularly likely to be true 
for the within-BHC specification, which captures changes for 
individual bank holding companies over time. More 
specifically, scaling factor changes would affect the quarter-to-
quarter variation in observations for the within-BHC 
regressions, but this noise could largely be averaged out in the 
across-BHC regressions.
To assess the extent of this problem, we rerun the within- 
and across-BHC regressions in Table 3, omitting all 
observations where the scaling factor used for value-at-risk 
estimates differs from the baseline value of three. These results 
are reported in Table 5.17 Clearly, the results are very similar to 
those in Table 3. Although not reported here, the results of the 
augmented within-BHC regression from Table 4 are also very 
similar when these observations are omitted. Thus, the results 
presented above do not appear to be driven by changes in the 
scaling factor.
5.M a r k e t  R i s k  C a p i t a l
and Actual Risk Exposures
The analysis in the previous section suggests that the minimum 
regulatory capital figures for market risk may contain 
information about market risk exposures that is not reflected in 
other sources of information in regulatory reports. However, 
the mere fact that in some instances the market risk capital 
figures are less than perfectly correlated with other sources of 
regulatory information does not, in and of itself, mean that the 
information in the market risk capital figures is valuable. The 
lack of correlation could, for instance, reflect random noise in 
the market risk capital figures that is unrelated to actual 
changes in risk exposure. Thus, an important question is 
whether the market risk capital figures contain accurate 
information that would allow us to distinguish true differences 
in market risk exposure, either between bank holding 
companies or for given bank holding companies over time.
In other words, an important assumption in all the analysis 
described above is that the market risk capital figures are 
accurate measures of bank holding companies’ true market risk 
exposures. There are a number of reasons to question this 
assumption. First, the market risk capital figures will provide 
an accurate indication of the true risk profile of a banking 
organization only to the extent that the underlying value-at-
risk model is accurate. While an independent assessment of the 
accuracy of these models is beyond the scope of this article, it is 
important to note that the market risk capital standards 
include an extensive set of qualitative standards intended to 
Table 5
Market Risk Capital and Trading Account Size: 













Trading 0.1787** 0.0739** 0.2450** 0.0683**
(0.0230) (0.0205) (0.0322) (0.0205)
Derivatives -0.0010* 0.0005*
(0.0004) (0.0002)
R2 0.706 0.070 0.774 0.093
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of required minimum capital 
for market risk to total assets for the bank holding company (BHC). All 
observations where the market risk capital figures are calculated with a 
scaling factor other than three are omitted. Trading is defined as the ratio 
of trading account assets plus trading account liabilities to total assets for 
the bank holding company. Trading account assets and liabilities are 
adjusted so that revaluation gains and losses enter on a net basis. Deriva-
tives are defined as the sum of the gross notional principals of interest 
rate, foreign exchange, equity, and commodity derivatives held in the 
trading account to total assets of the bank holding company. Across-BHC 
regressions are based on the average of the dependent and independent 
variables for each of the twenty-seven bank holding companies in the data 
set. Within-BHC regressions are estimated using fixed effects for each 
bank holding company.
**Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
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ensure that the models used for regulatory capital purposes are 
conceptually sound and implemented with integrity.18 While 
no guarantee of model accuracy, these qualitative standards 
provide a rigorous framework for detecting models that are 
significantly flawed.
In addition, it is notable that the market risk capital figures 
reported to supervisors are not direct measures of risk 
exposures. As noted above, the reported market risk capital 
figure equals the sum of the general market risk and specific 
risk components, each multiplied by a scaling factor.19 While 
the general market risk portion is always derived from value-at-
risk model estimates, the specific risk figures may be based on 
a risk measurement model or may be calculated using 
standardized regulatory weights. In the latter case, there is 
reason to question the extent to which they reflect true risk 
exposure. Finally, since the general market and specific risk 
figures are summed to form the overall capital charge, the 
charge will overstate actual risk exposures to the extent that 
these two forms of risk are less than perfectly correlated.
Empirical work to date presents somewhat conflicting 
evidence of the accuracy of the value-at-risk models that underlie 
the market risk capital requirements. Berkowitz and O’Brien 
(2002) examine the performance of value-at-risk models for a 
sample of large U.S. bank holding companies using confidential 
supervisory data that permit comparison of daily value-at-risk 
estimates with next-day trading results (profit and loss). They 
find substantial variation in the performance of value-at-risk 
models across bank holding companies, although on average the 
models appear to provide conservative estimates of the tail (99th 
percentile) of the profit and loss distribution. They also find that 
a simple GARCH model based on daily trading results is better at 
predicting changes in daily profit and loss volatility than are the 
value-at-risk estimates.
These results stand somewhat in contrast to the findings in 
Jorion (2002), who concludes that value-at-risk models are 
good predictors of future trading revenue variability. Jorion 
examines the value-at-risk disclosures made by large U.S. bank 
holding companies between 1995 and 1999. He finds that these 
figures are strongly significant predictors of the variability of 
the banks’ future trading revenues and that this predictive 
power continues to hold even after controlling for the extent of 
the institutions’ derivatives exposures. His conclusion is that 
the value-at-risk measures appear to contain useful 
information about banks’ future market risk exposures.
The difference in findings may lie in the implicit observation 
periods used in the two studies: Jorion (2002) focuses on 
trading variability over a quarterly horizon, while Berkowitz 
and O’Brien (2002) focus on the day-to-day variation in profit 
and loss. Christofferson, Diebold, and Schuermann (1998) find 
that the ability of GARCH-type models to produce superior 
forecasts of future volatility declines substantially as the 
holding period lengthens. The difference between the Jorion 
and Berkowitz and O’Brien findings could therefore reflect the 
different holding periods used in the two papers.
In the ideal, we would evaluate the accuracy of the market 
risk capital figures—in terms of their ability to distinguish 
differences in risk across institutions and over time—by 
comparing them with independent measures of bank holding 
companies’ market risk exposures. Unfortunately, such 
independent measures are not generally available. We can, 
however, derive reasonable proxies for market risk exposures 
using data on bank holding companies’ daily trading profits 
and losses. The Federal Reserve collects data on the daily profits 
and losses from trading operations for selected bank holding 
companies subject to the market risk capital standards.20 Using 
these data for a subset representing just under half the bank 
holding companies in the full sample, we calculate two 
different risk measures to proxy for the true extent of the bank 
holding companies’ market risk exposures.
We consider two distinct market risk proxies to capture 
different concepts of risk exposure. The first proxy is the 
quarterly volatility (standard deviation) of the daily profit and 
loss figures. Volatility is a widely accepted measure of risk 
exposure that captures the general dispersion of the 
distribution of profits and losses. Such a risk measure would be 
relevant for those concerned about the potential for day-to-day 
change in trading revenue, perhaps in the context of daily 
management of a trading desk.
In contrast, our second risk proxy is intended to capture the 
likely size of losses in the tail of the profit and loss distribution. 
Specifically, we calculate the average of the three largest daily 
losses in each quarter. This “tail risk” measure captures the 
potential extent of loss given that an extreme event occurs.21 Such 
tail risk measures have been advocated as being an appropriate 
measure of risk in situations where the likely size and impact of 
extreme events is of particular concern.22 Note that if the daily 
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profit and loss figures were normally distributed, volatility would 
be a sufficient statistic for both risk exposure concepts—general 
dispersion and likely tail losses—since the standard deviation of 
the profit and loss distribution would be all that is necessary to 
describe the size and shape of the tail. In that event, results using 
our two risk measures would be very similar.23
In considering these risk proxies, note that the underlying 
daily trading profit and loss data may themselves not be ideal 
measures of the true underlying risk of a bank’s trading 
operations. These profit and loss figures are composed of a 
variety of elements, including changes in the marked-to-
market value of overnight trading positions, margin income 
and fees from customer activity, and income or losses from 
intraday positions. Some portion of this activity—especially 
those positions that may be marked-to-market using models 
rather than market prices—may be handled differently at 
different firms. That may lead to cross-firm differences that are 
unrelated to true underlying risk exposures. Nonetheless, even 
if flawed, these data represent arguably the best source of 
information about the variability in banks’ realized trading 
revenue, and we will use them in our proxy measures of BHCs’ 
“true” market risk exposure.
To test the degree of new information contained in the 
market risk capital figures, we regress the two risk proxies on 
the market risk capital and on regulatory report variables 
describing the size and composition of the trading account. 
All variables are scaled by total end-of-quarter bank holding 
company assets. Summary statistics for the primary regression 
variables are reported in Table 6.
Similar to our previous analysis, the primary goal of this 
analysis is to assess the degree of correlation between the 
minimum regulatory capital figures for market risk and our 
proxies for BHCs’ true market risk exposure. If we find that a 
positive and significant correlation exists, even after 
controlling for other regulatory report variables that are 
intended to convey information about banks’ market risk 
Table 6
Summary Statistics for Principal Regression Variables
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Number of Observations Number of BHCs
Overall sample
Trading volatility 0.0004 0.0004 0.00004 0.0023 87 12
Trading tail risk 0.00003 0.00005 0.00000 0.00029 87 12
Market risk 0.0026 0.0018 0.0003 0.0070 87 12
Trading 0.1182 0.1192 0.0117 0.4754 87 12
Derivatives 10.854 11.078 0.0035 35.203 87 12
Within BHCs
Trading volatility 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0010 87 12
Trading tail risk 0.0000 0.00004 -0.0001 0.0002 87 12
Market risk 0.0000 0.0005 -0.0018 0.0017 87 12
Trading 0.0000 0.0157 -0.0571 0.0605 87 12
Derivatives 0.0000 2.332 -7.806 6.312 87 12
Across BHCs
Trading volatility 0.0004 0.0003 0.0001 0.0013 12 12
Trading tail risk 0.00004 0.00004 0.00000 0.00012 12 12
Market risk 0.0024 0.0017 0.0006 0.0056 12 12
Trading 0.0987 0.1095 0.0131 0.4149 12 12
Derivatives 8.896 10.236 0.0036 30.469 12 12
Source: Federal Reserve FR Y-9C Reports.
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: trading volatility equals the one-quarter-ahead quarterly volatility of daily trading profits and losses divided by total 
bank holding company (BHC) assets. Trading tail risk equals the one-quarter-ahead average of the three largest daily trading losses in a quarter divided by 
total BHC assets. Market risk equals minimum regulatory capital for market risk divided by total BHC assets. Trading equals trading account assets plus lia-
bilities divided by total BHC assets. Derivatives equal the gross notional amount of derivatives contracts divided by total BHC assets. Overall sample results 
reflect the variables as defined. Within-BHC results have BHC-specific means removed from each observation. Across-BHC results are based on BHC-
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exposures, then we interpret this as evidence that the minimum 
regulatory capital figures contain valuable new information 
about market risk exposures.
In this regard, it is important to note that the results are 
mainly directional, in the sense that we are examining the 
tendency of the market risk capital figures and the market risk 
proxies to move together. However, our analysis will not really 
address the question of whether or not the level of market risk 
capital is appropriate given these institutions’ true market risk 
exposures.24 That is, we are not attempting to conduct a back-
testing exercise in which we would establish whether the 
underlying value-at-risk figures are providing accurate 
measures of a given percentile of the loss distribution.
In the results presented below, we examine the 
correlation between the market risk capital figures and 
future values of the two market risk proxies. That is, we pair 
end-of-quarter market risk capital amounts with risk 
proxies based on daily profit and loss figures for the 
following quarter. Because the market risk capital figures are 
based on the average value-at-risk figures over the previous 
sixty trading days, this specification means that we are 
testing the ability of the market risk capital figures to 
provide forward-looking information about BHCs’ market 
risk exposures.25
As discussed in Jorion (2002) and Berkowitz and O’Brien 
(2002), there are a number of reasons to suspect that market 
risk capital figures based on lagged, average value-at-risk 
estimates might not contain much information about future 
market risk exposure. For one, positions within the trading 
account can change rapidly over time, particularly when 
markets have been volatile. Thus, lagged value-at-risk estimates 
may reflect a trading account composition that is very different 
from the positions generating current and future trading 
profits and losses. Second, even if positions are held fixed, 
market conditions themselves may have changed, so that the 
volatility of the overall portfolio is different. To the extent that 
either of these factors comes into play, market risk capital 
figures based on past value-at-risk estimates may not be 
particularly strong predictors of future trading volatility.
The results of this analysis are reported in Tables 7 and 8. 
Table 7 contains results looking across bank holding 
companies, while Table 8 presents results looking within 
individual institutions over time. In each table, the top panel 
contains the results for the market risk proxy based on trading 
revenue volatility. The bottom panel contains the risk proxy 
based on trading revenue tail estimates.
Turning first to Table 7, we note that the results in the first 
column suggest that the market risk capital figures are 
positively correlated with the future market risk proxies when 
looking across bank holding companies. That is, banks with 
higher market risk capital figures on average tend to have 
higher future market risk exposures, although the coefficient is 
statistically significant only for the regression based on trading 
revenue volatility. As the results in the next column indicate, 
bank holding companies with larger trading accounts on 
average also tend to have higher future market risk, although 
again this result is statistically significant only for the regression 
based on the trading revenue volatility risk proxy.
The information contained in the market risk capital 
variable, however, appears to be much more limited when both 
trading account size and market risk capital are included in the 
Table 7
Market Risk Capital and Future Market Risk
across Bank Holding Companies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Future trading volatility
Market risk 0.1047+ -0.0189 -0.0006
(0.0501) (0.0642) (0.0724)




R2 (between) 0.304 0.584 0.588 0.607
F-test (p-value) 0.019 0.297
Future trading tail risk
Market risk 0.0062 -0.0007 -0.0004
(0.0064) (0.0103) (0.0118)




R2 (between) 0.087 0.158 0.159 0.165
F-test (p-value) 0.459 0.835
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: The dependent variable in the top half of the table is trading volatil-
ity, defined as the one-quarter-ahead quarterly volatility of daily trading 
profit and loss for each bank holding company. The dependent variable in 
the bottom half of the table is trading tail risk, the one-quarter-ahead 
average of the three largest daily trading losses in each quarter for each 
bank holding company. Market risk equals required market risk capital. 
Trading is trading account assets plus liabilities. Derivatives equal the total 
gross notional principal of all derivatives contracts held in the trading 
account. All variables are scaled by total bank holding company assets. 
The regression results are based on average values for each bank holding 
company over the quarters that it is in the sample (between regression 
results). F-test p-values are from a test of the hypothesis that the coeffi-
cients on market risk and trading are both equal to zero.
**Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
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regressions. The third column of Table 7 contains these results. 
When both variables are included in the specification, the 
market risk capital variable becomes negative and is no longer 
statistically significant. In contrast, the coefficient on trading 
account size remains positive and continues to be statistically 
significant in the regression using trading revenue volatility as 
the risk proxy. These results are further reinforced when a 
variable controlling for the bank holding companies’ 
derivatives exposures is included (the last column of Table 7).26
These findings suggest that when we look across bank 
holding companies, there appears to be little additional 
information in the market risk capital figures beyond that 
conveyed simply by knowing the average size of the trading 
account. However, the results in Table 8 suggest that market 
risk capital figures contain valuable new information about 
banks’ market risk exposures when we look within an 
individual bank holding company over time. The results in the 
first column of the table demonstrate a positive and statistically 
Table 8
Market Risk Capital and Future Market Risk within Bank Holding Companies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Future trading volatility
Market risk 0.1027* 0.1143** 0.1223** 0.1215*
(0.0392) (0.0380) (0.0378) (0.081)






R2 (within) 0.370 0.352 0.424 0.447 0.652
F-test (p-value) 0.002 0.002
Future trading tail risk
Market risk 0.0129+ 0.0147+ 0.0179* 0.0184+
(0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0071) (0.014)






R2 (within) 0.428 0.432 0.460 0.542 0.768
F-test (p-value) 0.084 0.100
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: The dependent variable in the top half of the table is trading volatility, defined as the one-quarter-ahead quarterly volatility of daily trading profit and 
loss for each bank holding company. The dependent variable in the bottom half of the table is trading tail risk, the one-quarter-ahead average of the three 
largest daily trading losses in each quarter for each bank holding company. Market risk equals required market risk capital. Trading is trading account assets 
plus liabilities. In the rows labeled trading components, trading is divided into its component pieces (Treasury securities, U.S. government agency securities, 
municipal securities, mortgage-backed securities, all other debt securities, other trading assets, trading assets in foreign offices, net revaluation gains, and 
short positions). To keep the table concise, we do not report the coefficients on these variables separately. Derivatives equal the total gross notional principal 
of all derivatives contracts held in the trading account. In the rows labeled derivatives components, derivatives are divided into the component pieces (inter-
est rate, foreign exchange, equity, and commodity). To keep the table concise, we do not report the coefficients on these variables separately. All variables are 
scaled by total bank holding company assets. The regressions are estimated using fixed effects for each of the bank holding companies in the data set and 
include a dummy variable for 1998:3. F-test p-values are from a test of the hypothesis that the coefficients on market risk and trading are both equal to zero.
**Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
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significant correlation between market risk capital and both 
future market risk proxies.27 The estimation results further 
suggest that this correlation is economically important: the 
point estimates suggest that a 1-standard-deviation change in a 
BHC’s market risk capital figure (relative to the BHC-average 
value) would lead to a 0.25-standard-deviation change in 
future trading revenue volatility and a 0.15-standard-deviation 
change in future tail losses.
Interestingly, although there is a statistically significant 
correlation between each of the market risk proxies and trading 
account size, the coefficients are negative (column 2 of 
Table 8). When both market risk capital and trading account 
size are included in the specification (column 3), the coefficient 
on market risk capital continues to be positive and statistically 
significant. This finding does not change when controlling for 
the size of the banks’ derivatives exposures (column 4), or 
when trading account and derivatives positions are broken out 
into more detailed categories (column 5). Furthermore, the 
economic importance of changes in market risk capital is 
actually strengthened in these specifications: a 1-standard-
deviation change in market risk capital is associated with a 
0.30-standard-deviation change in future trading revenue 
volatility and a 0.20 change in future tail losses in these 
enhanced specifications.
These results suggest that the market risk capital figures 
provide meaningful information about variation in bank 
holding companies’ market risk exposures over time that is not 
reflected in information available elsewhere in the banks’ 
regulatory reports. The results in Table 8 suggest that market risk 
capital figures contain useful information about future trading 
volatility even after controlling for the composition of the 
trading account and derivatives positions. These results hold 
despite theoretical arguments suggesting that lagged value-at-
risk estimates might not have much predictive power for future 
trading profit and loss—and despite the relatively small sample 
size used to produce the estimates (fewer than ninety obser-
vations, once future market risk proxies have been created). 
The analysis suggests that the market risk capital figures 
contained in bank holding company regulatory reports provide 
new information that can help us understand the evolution of 
market risk exposures at individual banks over time.28
6.C o n c l u s i o n
The market risk capital figures disclosed in bank holding 
companies’ regulatory reports are potentially an important 
source of new information about risks undertaken by large 
banking organizations subject to the market risk capital 
standards. Our results support that conclusion. More 
specifically, the capital figures seem to contain information 
about these exposures that is not reflected in other data in the 
regulatory reports.
Our analysis suggests that, compared with information 
already available in regulatory reports, market risk capital figures 
are most useful for tracking changes in individual organizations’ 
risk exposures over time. Despite a number of theoretical and 
practical reasons to doubt the ability of market risk capital 
figures to predict future market risk, the regulatory report figures 
do appear to contain valuable information about future risk 
exposures. Thus, the figures provide a forward-looking indicator 
of the evolution of market risk exposures over time.
Across institutions, in contrast, the capital figures appear to 
provide little information beyond what is already indicated by 
the average size of an organization’s trading account. That is, 
we can tell a lot about the relative importance of market risk at 
an institution simply by knowing the size of its trading account 
in relation to its overall asset size.
These conclusions have to be tempered by the recognition 
that the required capital figures are noisy proxies for the actual 
When we look across bank holding 
companies, there appears to be little 
additional information in the market risk 
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risk exposures facing these institutions. In addition, this analysis 
focuses primarily on the data available in regulatory reports and 
does not quantitatively assess the value of information available 
from other sources, such as SEC filings. Nonetheless, the 
regulatory report data provide a unique source of consistently 
defined market risk exposure measures for a relatively wide 
range of institutions. As we move forward and as more data 
become available, there will be additional opportunities to assess 
the usefulness of the market risk capital figures for under-
standing the risks facing large bank holding companies.Endnotes
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1. Euro-currency Standing Committee (1994, p. 1).
2. For a discussion of the goals of supervisors in calibrating the market 
risk capital standards, see Hendricks and Hirtle (1997).
3. Specifically, the market risk capital standards apply to all positions 
in the trading portfolio, as well as to all commodity and foreign 
exchange positions, whether held inside or outside the portfolio. 
Positions in the trading portfolio are not subject to the credit risk 
capital standards, with the exception of derivatives, which are also 
subject to capital requirements for counterparty credit risk exposures. 
See U.S. Department of the Treasury et al. (1996) for a complete 
discussion.
4. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996) for a full 
description of the international market risk capital standards. The U.S. 
version of these standards can be found in U.S. Department of the 
Treasury et al. (1996).
5. See Hendricks and Hirtle (1997) for a discussion of the rationale 
behind the use of value-at-risk models for regulatory capital 
requirements and the choice of supervisory parameters specified in the 
capital standards. See Jorion (2002) for a fuller description of value-at-
risk models.
6. See Hendricks and Hirtle (1997) for a fuller description of these 
“back-testing” procedures.
7. These data are reported on Schedule HC-I of Form FR Y-9C, the 
quarterly balance sheet and income statement reports filed by all large 
bank holding companies to the Federal Reserve, and on Schedule
RC-R of the Call Reports filed by commercial banks.
8. Note that it is difficult to interpret the ratio of market risk capital 
to total capital as a proxy for the share of a bank holding company’s 
risk accounted for by market risk, because the minimum regulatory 
capital amounts are potentially very imprecise proxies for the levels of 
credit and market risk exposures. This is particularly apt to be true 
for the credit risk capital requirements, which are currently under 
revision largely because of their failure to be appropriately risk-
sensitive.
9. For a description of losses suffered by banks at this time, 
see Kraus (1998).
10. For instance, of the twelve U.S.-owned BHCs that reported market 
risk capital figures in their June 2000 regulatory reports, eleven also 
reported value-at-risk figures in their quarterly SEC filings.
11. Of the eleven U.S.-owned bank holding companies that reported 
market risk capital figures in their 2000 quarterly SEC filings, three 
presented the figures as quarterly averages of daily value-at-risk esti-
mates, five presented the figures as cumulative averages for the calendar 
year, and three presented the figures as twelve-month lagged averages.
12. In a recent statement, the Working Group on Public Disclosure, a 
group composed of senior representatives of large, internationally 
active banking institutions, concluded that cross-company differences 
in risk reporting appropriately reflect differences in the approach to 
risk management across institutions. See Working Group on Public 
Disclosure (2001).
13. We examine in the following section whether the additional 
“information” contains true information about risk exposures, or is 
simply random noise.
14. The results of this analysis are not substantially affected if the 
market risk capital figure is expressed as a share of total minimum 
regulatory capital—that is, if the market risk variable is constructed as 
the ratio of market risk capital to the sum of minimum regulatory 
capital for market plus credit risk. In addition, the results are quite 
similar if the regression is estimated using a log-log specification (that 
is, if the regression is conducted using the logs of market risk capital 
and trading account size).
15. To account for any time-series correlation that could cause 
observations across bank holding companies to be correlated, we ran 
two additional variations of the within-BHC regressions. The first 
variation included a correction for first-order serial correlation in the 
regression error terms. The results of these regressions were not 
qualitatively different from the simpler regression specification 
reported in Table 3. Second, we ran a specification including dummies 
for each calendar quarter in the sample period. The results are not 
affected by the inclusion of these variables; the within R2 increases 
somewhat (from 4 percent to 12 percent), but none of the individual 
dummy coefficients is statistically significant and an F-test cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on the dummies are jointly 
equal to zero (the p-value of the test is .402). Thus, the results reported 
in the text are those excluding the quarterly dummy variables.Endnotes (Continued)
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16. These data are reported in Schedules HC-B and HC-F of the
FR Y-9C Reports filed by BHCs and in Schedules RC-D and RC-L of 
the Call Reports filed by commercial banks. These variables were 
included in the regulatory reports starting in the mid-1990s to 
provide information about the nature of banks’ trading businesses, 
including the extent of market risk exposure. While the breakdown 
of trading account positions into these categories might provide a 
general sense of the relative riskiness of  banks’ trading portfolios, 
the data do not include a number of key risk attributes—such as 
maturity, national market origin, and whether derivatives positions 
are long or short—that are important determinants of the actual 
risks arising from trading activities. Thus, there is reason to think 
that market risk capital figures based on banks’ risk measurement 
models may provide additional information on the market risks 
facing banking institutions.
17. Since the scaling factor used to calculate regulatory capital charges 
is not publicly available, these regressions are based on confidential 
data provided by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. The results 
in Table 5 are presented so that neither the identity of the BHCs in 
question nor the number of BHCs subject to higher scaling factors is 
revealed.
18. See Hendricks and Hirtle (1997) for a fuller description of the 
qualitative standards.
19. Technically, each institution reports a “market risk equivalent 
assets” figure, which equals 12.5 times the sum of the general market risk 
and specific risk components, each multiplied by its own scaling factor. 
The 12.5 conversion factor is applied to put the market risk capital figure 
on a comparable basis with the credit-risk-weighted assets figure that 
arises from the credit risk capital standards. These two figures are 
summed to form the denominator of the risk-based capital ratios (12.5 
is the inverse of 8 percent, the minimum total capital requirement).
20. These data are collected by the Federal Reserve on a confidential 
basis as part of the supervisory process. The results in this article are 
presented in such a way as to maintain the confidentiality of the BHC-
level data and the identities of the particular BHCs in the sample.
I would like to thank Jim O’Brien, Jim Embersit, and Denise Dittrich 
of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors for making the data 
available. These data are an expanded version of those used in 
Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002).
21. With approximately sixty daily observations per quarter, the three 
largest losses represent the 95th percentile.
22. See, for instance, Crouhy, Galai, and Mark (2001), who suggest a 
version of such tail risk measures termed “extreme VAR.”
23. Aside from the tail risk proxy reported in the text, we also 
constructed several alternatives intended to provide different 
estimates of the tail of the daily profit and loss distribution. 
Specifically, we constructed tail risk proxies based on: 1) the single 
largest daily loss during a quarter, 2) the single largest daily change 
(either profit or loss) during a quarter, and 3) the average of the three 
largest losses and three largest gains during the quarter. We also 
calculated each of the four tail risk measures and subtracted the 
quarterly average profit and loss (which was nearly always positive). 
The regression results reported in this section were not qualitatively 
affected by the particular choice of tail estimate or by the treatment of 
the average quarterly profit and loss amount.
24. This question is the focus of much of the analysis in Berkowitz and 
O’Brien (2002).
25. Jorion (2002) strongly argues that such a future risk specification 
is the key test of the information contained in value-at-risk 
disclosures. The regressions in that paper are all structured to test the 
forward-looking information content of the value-at-risk estimates 
disclosed in banks’ annual reports.
26. We do not report across-BHC results breaking out the trading and 
derivatives variables into their component parts because the limited 
number of observations in the across-BHC specification (just one per 
BHC in the sample) precludes using that many independent 
variables.
27. As a broad control for differences across quarters during the 
regression sample period, the regressions were estimated using 
dummy variables for each calendar quarter in the sample period. 
These results suggest that only the dummy variable for 1998:3 was 
statistically significant. The hypothesis that the coefficients on the 
other dummy variables were jointly equal to zero could not be 
rejected. Thus, the results reported here include just the dummy 
variable for 1998:3.
28. One caveat to this conclusion is that because our analysis pools
data across bank holding companies, the results reflect the average 
experience of the institutions in the sample. It is quite possible that 
for some individual firms, the correlation between market risk capital 
figures and actual market risk exposures is much weaker than it is 
for others.References
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